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Abstract 
This thesis drives a twofold argument about the Swedish policies on foreign aid 
and development. First of all is it stated how there has been a continuity in this 
particular field of policy has since its inception in the 1960s and the issue has in 
the closest become depoliticised in mainstream politics. With the intent of 
bringing this field of policy back in to the light of politics and ideology Roland 
Barthes concept of myth and Martin Hall’s “mythology as methodology” is 
applied. The second argument is then that two intertwined processes, or breaks, 
have been crucial in the, for the policies, foundational understandings of 
development and aid and serve as civilizational myths. The first is 
Enlightenment’s break with the Aristotelian notion of a circular teleology in 
favour of an infinitely linear progressive ditto, while the second is Adam Smith’s 
break with mercantilism and the new understanding of the economy as a free 
market with absolute and mutual gains. To conclude are alternatives to the 
conventional understanding of development pointed towards. 
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1 Introduction 
“The one per cent- aid was our lifebuoy to keep us from drowning in shame.” 
    - Rune Andréasson, 1983 
 
For more than fifty years one of the most prominent guiding principles in Swedish 
foreign policy has been what is known as the goal of one percent, the idea that one 
percent of the Swedish GNI should be directed towards foreign aid. The quotation 
above from the cartoonist and creator of the children’s cartoon Bamse, was made 
after the social democratic government stated its intent to temporarily lower the 
goal to 0,93% due to the Swedish economy at the time. The quote is interesting in 
two aspects, in part it is telling of how fundamental this principle is in Swedish 
policy but at the same time is gives a hint of a more fundamental critique of its 
actual intent. Both aspects will be prominent in this thesis. The Swedish foreign 
aid policy is by the government said to stand on two legs, one being long term 
developmental aid and the other one the more short termed humanitarian aid 
(Regeringen, 2015). While both are interesting fields of research, the former one 
is what this study will revolve around along with an ambition to find the 
ideological foundation for why it in mainstream politics is more or less taken for 
granted. 
In a way will this thesis attempt to make an argument that is twofold and 
based on a, if not critique, but questioning. The first part of the argument is that 
the Swedish policy on foreign aid has since its inception been fairly coherent and 
formulated in similar terms (most prominently through the mentioned slogan-like 
goal of one percent) and in this way has been naturalized on an ideological scale 
and reduced to a technocratic discussion on implementation and efficiency. From 
this point of departure will I, with the good help of Cynthia Weber (2010) and 
Martin Hall (2006), apply Roland Barthes concept of myth as a way of 
approaching the guiding documents of Swedish aid policy and make an attempt to 
reveal the ideological foundations upon which they stand. The second part of the 
argument is then that these policies have persisted and are seen as natural and 
legitimate due to them being based on civilization-defining myths. Drawing upon 
Gilbert Rist’s (2011) approach towards development as part of our modern 
religion and therefore a sort of collective certainty. My reasons for this study are 
in other words are not to evaluate if the policies can be considered good or not but 
rather, much like several scholar’s (e.g. Rist, 2011; Escobar; 2007; Isbister, 2006) 
concerned with development policies on the global scale has done, with the intent 
of exposing depoliticized ‘facts’ and what is considered common sense as 
political speech in order for them to be interrogated and brought back into the 
light of ideology. Partly is this a question of legitimacy but it could also be a way 
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to move forward and beyond in what may be new ways of approaching the field 
of development and foreign aid 
1.1 Question 
As noted there has been quite a lot written on development with a global 
perspective and with a critical stance, but I believe a similar approach to a 
Swedish context is an area where contribution is needed. Most written on the case 
of Sweden has been done so through the lens of efficiency. However is not my 
approach intended to point to the rights and wrongs of Swedish aid policy but 
rather to understand its origins and its uncontested position. And like stated earlier 
does not my interest lie with the policy process but rather with the more deeply 
rooted ideological assumptions, to reveal what is not stated but commonly 
understood. This thesis will therefore attempt to answer the question: Why have 
there been such continuity in the Swedish policies on foreign aid? 
 
1.2 The field of development and its continuity 
Along with Sweden’s stance on issues such as neutrality in warfare and the, 
globally relatively, generous reception of immigrants and refugees the Swedish 
policies on aid and development, and most prominently through the goal of one 
percent has been a source of both notoriety and pride for Sweden in the global 
community (Wolgemuth, 2012, p. 5). The Swedish aid has often been at the very 
top of the list when comparing how much countries are giving in relation to their 
GNI, for example did in 2008 the Swedish government proudly proclaim (with 
reference to Center for Global Development (CGD) and Development Assistance 
Research Assosiates (DARA)) that Sweden was the world leader at giving foreign 
aid (Regeringen, 2008). The principle of one percent was first introduced as part 
of a 1962 proposition that for the first time created a major framework for policies 
on development in Sweden. This proposition has since been known as the “aid 
bible”. Prior to the Second World War, aid and development policy had been a 
minor part of politics, both in Sweden and more globally, and to the extent it 
existed it was mostly intertwined with colonies and the countries that ruled them 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 4). Apart from Christian missionaries in Africa 
during the 19th century whom can be said to be the first expression of foreign aid 
was there in 1952 in Sweden formed a committee for “technical aid to lesser 
developed areas” sprung out of peoples movements (Odén, 2006, p. 52).  
The 1962 proposition is one of four documents that have provided the major 
guidelines for the Swedish development policies, the other ones being 
propositions from 1968, 1978 and 2003. Each has been built upon the previous 
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ones and overall there has been little change between them (Wolgemuth, 2012, p. 
6). The 1968 proposition did point more to the importance of economic 
independence and the 1978 proposition did put emphasis on the need for the 
policy area of aid and development not to be a separated sphere but rather present 
in all fields of policy. Naturally seen in the light of passing time were the biggest 
changes made in the 2003 proposition. This document, that still serves as the 
guiding one for development and aid policies, is an updated version for the new 
millennia that included more recently highlighted issues such as gender equality 
and environmental concerns (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003). Despite the passing of 
time and a changing world has the fundamentals though remained in the 
propositions, Sweden should still direct one per cent of its GNI towards foreign 
aid with the intent of promoting development and assisting in situations of conflict 
or crisis. To the extent that there has been changes in the aid policies through the 
years these have mostly been in the implementation side of the aid, in terms of 
efficiency, control and evaluation, and the number of receiving countries. But 
these have still been made within the frames of the development strategies and 
goals stipulated in the propositions (Howell & Lind, 2009, p. 1291).  
To further show the continuity and the broad in the Swedish aid policies it 
should be noted that the four mentioned propositions have been initiated and 
passed by three governments led by the social democrats and one coalition 
government consisting of the at the time non-socialist block (center party, liberals, 
and conservatives). Also have these policies during the two other periods of 
conservative governments not been replaced or changed in their fundamentals but 
only in terms of implementation. The most notable of these changes was during 
the recent alliance government under which the number of recipients of aid was 
considerably slimmed along with more demands for evaluation and control (SR, 
2007). The conservative party whom led these two governments have traditionally 
been against the one percent goal and instead in favour of the UN set minimum of 
0,7 percent but did recently change their stance towards the stance shared with the 
rest of the parties in parliament (with the exception of the right wing Swedish 
democrats) (Svenska dagbladet, 2013). This has however not showed in actual 
policy as the foreign aid has been laying steadily around the stipulated one 
percent, even with the conservatives in government. This could of course perhaps 
be explained through the constitutions of the governments where certain parties 
have foreign aid as more of a profile issue than others, by the policy process or the 
contexts in which aid may not have been an issue of importance. Still were there 
for example voices raised from the conservative party when there was talk of 
neglecting the one percent goal in 1974 (Riksdagen, 1974). In a similar fashion as 
the conservatives protest, was the social democratic stray from the staked path 
mentioned in relation to the introductory quote met with critique from the liberal 
party whom wrote a motion that harshly criticized this, in their words, betrayal 
(Riksdagen, 1984). With this would I argue that there is a consensus in Swedish 
politics concerning the importance and the positive aspects of a foreign aid in the 
form that it now is and has been since this field of policy’s first implementation. 
Wolgemuth (2012, p. 6) and Odén (2006, p. 9), whom both have studied the 
Swedish developmental policies over the last 50 years, also express these views. 
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More recently have the guiding proposition from 2003 stood untouched by both 
eight years of conservative rule and the newly elected social democratic 
government. Even the parties on their respective ends of the left/right-scale in the 
Swedish parliament thinks along fairly similar lines with the left party wanting to 
keep the goal and adding another directed towards environmental aid while the 
right-wing Sweden democrats actually wants to lower it, but only to the by the 
UN recommended level of 0,7% of GNI. A goal that recently only was fulfilled by 
five states: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands and Luxembourg (UN 
millennium project, 2005).  
In summary would I argue that there has been a broad consensus of the view 
that, first of all, Sweden has an obligation towards poorer countries to assist them 
and to do this with intent of them developing and closing the gap of inequalities. 
Furthermore should this will to help be channelled through an act of giving or 
supporting roughly with one percent of our yearly income, a level that globally 
has been high and at times unmatched. 
1.2.1 Sweden in the global context 
 
Since its inception has the Swedish aid policy been closely intertwined with those 
policies of the international society, most prominently with the programs 
formulated by the UN but also through the World bank. The field of development 
and aid began to be formulated shortly after the second world war in what has 
been described as the “discovery of the poor” (Escobar, 2012, p. 21). The often 
used example is the American president Harry Truman’s speech in the UN in 
which the term “underdeveloped” for the first time was used and the developed 
world’s obligation to help these countries and peoples to become developed was 
expressed. Through this was the foundation for developmental programs and 
policies and their intent laid (Escobar, 2012, p. 3). The UN did first mention the 
goal of one per cent in 1960 and did so in more defined and commonly agreed 
terms in 1964 where this was said to be something to be strived for by the 
developed countries (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 20). This has as stated earlier 
been lowered since to 0,7 percent, a level achieved by only a few countries.  
It is important to acknowledge the role the UN has played in the agenda 
setting but at the same time have the UN also had a more pragmatic role due to 
much of the aid having been distributed multilaterally through the UN in the form 
of programs and projects. In 1964, for example, did 52% of the Swedish aid go to 
the UN development program (UNDP) as well as some additional minor UN 
programs while 36,1% was devoted to the International development association 
(IDA) that is led by the World bank (Utrikesdepartementet, 1968, p. 9). Today is 
about half of the aid given through multilateral organizations and instead has the 
bilateral aid grown (Sida, 2009). However is the Swedish aid still formulated in 
some terms stipulated by the UN which include a commitment to the Millennium 
goals, the Busan Partnership of effective development co-operation, the Paris 
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declaration on aid effectiveness and the Accra agenda for action (Regeringen, 
2015).  
The millennium goals are, as the name suggests, the overarching intent of UN 
developmental policy, formulated in 2000 and set to be achieved by the end of 
2015. The visions stipulated are grand, but stated to be achievable and include 
among other things a 50% decrease of the amount of people living in absolute 
poverty, compared to the numbers in 1990, and major improvement in issues 
concerning health, education and discrimination (UN millennium project, 2005, p. 
xii). The other three agendas to which Sweden has committed are instead of goal 
oriented concerned with implementation and efficiency. For this study the 
division between multilateral and bilateral aid is not of importance more than to 
what extent it implicates autonomy in the formulation of policy. As stated above 
cannot Sweden be totally separated from the global doctrines of development but 
must rather be seen a part of them. Despite this does Sweden stand out as a case in 
the sense it takes pride in its position as a donor globally along with the continuity 
in the aid policies which many countries with time has come to change by 
lowering the portion of their GNI given.  
 
1.3 Earlier research, critique and positioning 
What I so far have described is, among other things, continuity. A field of policy 
that is fairly young have in the Swedish context since its emergence more or less 
looked the same and have not been debated in its fundamentals but rather through 
the lens of pragmatism, through implementation and efficiency towards a 
commonly stated and accepted goal (Odén, 2006, p. 15). Now, this may not in 
itself make for a puzzle, or even something interesting, but in the light of more 
critical theories and scholars as well as the ambiguous results do I believe there to 
be questions yet unresolved. 
Through dependency theory, postcolonial theory and later, theory on 
postdevelopment, have voices been raised ever since the end colonialism and 
emergence of developmental aid, concerning both the intentions and results of 
development and aid policies. The dependency school grew big in the 1960s and 
70s and draws upon Marxist theory in its analysis of the world’s material 
distribution. The approach is in part historical and the main argument is that the 
poverty of the third world is not a fact despite the development of the west but 
rather because of it (Isbister, 2006, p. 41). In this sense would development 
schemes be seen as a way to legitimize a neocolonial exploitation that is a 
continuum of colonialism, although in a new form (Kapoor, 2002, p. 649). 
Postcolonialism, in its turn, drew upon dependency theory but did so within the 
linguistic turn. With a poststructuralist analysis done through linguistics, 
psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics the core argument of postcolonialism is 
how the third world is constituted through the process of othering (Kapoor, 2002, 
p. 650). In other words is it created through language and as the colonial powers’ 
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and peoples’ opposite. A major aspect that proves difficult within the field of aid 
and development is that of agency. Even though more recent policies have 
addressed the issue of owning the development process, the basis of giving aid is 
an unequal relationship where scholars such as Fanon would argue that nothing 
good can come form this process but true development cannot be received but 
only taken (Fanon, 1997, p. 195). The postdevelopmentalists share much of the 
analysis made by both dependency theorists and postcolonial scholars, that 
discursive practices enable a form of neo-colonialism that should be seen as a new 
expression of the old power relations rather than as a break from it (Escobar, 
2011, p. 6). Something recurring in these scholars text’s is also how they express 
the need to place practices in context and even if the initial take-off point, or even 
the conclusion, is a critique, is the analysis not always aimed at evaluating the 
doctrines of development but understanding them and their history, both 
materially and ideologically (Escobar, 2011, p. 58; Rist, 2008, p. 20). For my 
study this gives me a point of departure in the interest for the ideological 
foundations rather than the pragmatic policy process. Postdevelopmental scholars 
also make efforts to move beyond the current paradigm of development to find 
alternatives, and rather than alternative developments they speak of alternatives to 
development (Escobar, 2011, p. 215; Rist, 2008, p. 130).  
Apart from the scholarly critique there is a great ambiguity concerning the 
achievements and results of foreign aid policies. Most obviously in the fact that 
there still is widespread poverty, hunger, disease and a lack of welfare and well 
being. Escobar points to how many third world debtors have paid far more each 
year than they have received in new lending. His examples stems from the 1982 
Latin American debt crisis and he points out how food availability for poor people 
in the third world during the same period have fallen by around 30 percent 
(Escobar, 2012, p. 212). The UN’s own rapport, Investing in development, made 
more than halfway into the time frame for the millennium goals, shows that while 
there has been significant economic growth in east Asia, have the number of 
people in Sub-Saharan whom lives in absolute poverty actually increased instead 
of halved (UN millennium project, 2005, p. 9). Chaudhry and Perelman (2013, p. 
813) do also point to the contradictory results based on the “human development 
report” from the UN in 2011 were there indeed have been a growth in income 
overall in third world countries but at the same time have the income distribution 
become more unequal. Further on do they acknowledge an improvement in health 
and education but at the same time states how the environment has worsened in 
several aspects. Overall od they deliver a harsh critique towards the actions made 
in the area of poverty reduction and argues that while it may be an admirable 
project the current practices leaves the structures of power untouched (Chaudhry 
& Perelman, 2013, p. 820). The conclusion drawn is how developmental practices 
are in need of major reorganization.  
One of the big debates in academia related to development and aid is the 
question of the relationship between aid and economic growth. A lot of research 
has been done on the topic but without a consensus or definitive conclusions. 
Mosley (2015, p. 106) refers to a study by Rajan and Subramaniam that shows no 
significant association between aid and economic growth. His own findings 
  7 
suggests a linkage that is “modestly significant” and concludes that if aid is to be 
effective it has to be seriously rethought (Mosley, 2015, p. 114). Another study 
made by Boone shows no correlation between aid and decreasing poverty. An 
argument from the advocates of a correlation points to how received aid often is 
used for consumption and therefore does not show as a contributor of production 
value (Odén, 2006, p. 145). In any case it is a questionable relationship that gives 
reason to further study the field.  
Finally will I track back from the numbers and to the realm of theory and ideas 
where I would like to position my study. The postdevelopmental critics have 
pointed out how policies are formulated in a top-down fashion, with a clear 
direction from west and the self-proclaimed developed world (Escobar, 2011, p. 
5). Policies on development are therefore said to have taken a technocratic form 
that in some ways can be said to be separated from politics (Escobar, 2011, p. 
143). Like stated earlier are my intentions not to evaluate how well the policies on 
development and aid work but instead to find its ideological foundation, to bring it 
back from the technocratic depoliticised sphere and into the light of politics. The 
mentioned Rist and Escobar have both taken a similar approach to development 
on the global scale but I would like to move to the national scale and the case of 
Sweden, much because this is a fairly untouched area. Odén (2006, p. 10) does 
include a good bit of the Swedish policies in his mapping of the history of ideas 
within foreign aid, but rather than pointing to the theories used, like Odén does, 
my intent is to try and understand why they gain legitimacy and often are seen as 
nothing but common sense.  
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2 Approach 
2.1 Theory 
I have already mentioned continuity as a central concept in this study and I would 
now like to elaborate on what that continuity represents in this particular case. 
Because in this case the continuity, would I argue, more than anything is an 
expression, or a symptom, of something that has become generally accepted or 
even naturalised. I have attempted to make the argument that there has been a 
great continuity in the Swedish foreign aid policies and that this is an expression 
of how some things are taken for granted and have the status of paradigmatic truth 
among policy makers. In other words do they not get questioned or are even 
possible to be questioned because they are part of what constitutes our perception 
of the world and our societal order. In order to move on towards my method and 
approach of treating the policies on aid as a political myth I will discuss a few of 
the different ways to understand the politically possible and to decipher and 
question it.   
2.1.1 Establishing and understanding the uncontested 
 
Philosopher Charles Taylor calls this way of making sense of the world “social 
imaginary”, and describes our specific western modern social imaginary that he 
argues to be fundamental for our perception of the world and society. The 
fundamentals for western modernity, he argues, are a market economy based on 
trade, a self-governing people of atomised individuals and the existence of a 
public sphere that is separated from the private (Taylor, 2007, p. 2). Taylor (2007, 
p. 21) argues that these values have their origins in a Lockean-Grotean moral 
order where the most important concept is freedom and through this the idea of 
the individual being the principal political entity. This is a break from earlier 
orders where perhaps the family or community was seen as the principal unit and 
society was too a much greater extent built on personal relations. Along with this 
atomised view on the individual is the new order secular, not in the sense of a 
total rejection of religion but as a separation between holy and the profane, and 
with this a separation between the public and the private. The public sphere is 
sprung from an economic understanding of society as a market, full of temporary 
encounters and exchanges, were rationality is the basis for decision making, a 
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society disenchanted (Taylor, 207, p. 154). Taylor argues that it made it possible 
by a new way of understanding hierarchies and through this a possibility of 
equality. When the public sphere consists of individuals, all with the same rights, 
all inequalities must be legitimized. The king cannot longer rule by appointment 
by God but the sovereignty must be supported through the social contract. Of 
course, it has to be noted here how the definitions of individuals and the freedoms 
that came with it only changed slowly. As we know these free individuals in the 
public sphere most often were confined to white adult men of a certain economic 
status (Taylor, 2007, p. 22).  
The last aspect of the social imaginary is according to Taylor the 
establishment of the said free market economy that goes in line with the free 
individuals and the public, secular sphere. This is a formation of an economy 
where all needs all, rather than the self-sufficient family. Individuals do now 
become professionals and trade for their needs (Taylor, 2007, p. 75). Taylor does 
here draws a connection between the protestant ethics and the general 
professionalization that in a somewhat Weberian sense created a rational order by 
which we live. Two values that are important for this that are prominent in 
protestant ethics are a sanctification of the ordinary life and a rejection of the 
Aristotelian teleology (Taylor, 2007, p. 74 & 80). This has an impact on 
production as it becomes connected with power, but also with progression and 
development. This new mode of narration is then seen organic and infinite, the 
rational ever progressing humanism (Taylor, 2007, p. 175). At the same time it is 
an expression of the new societal formation, one that is defined by the collective 
actions of atomised individuals. 
While Taylor’s social imaginary will be brought up again later in the analysis, 
what is important for this part of this thesis is how it deals with the formation of 
an order. Because these values are by Taylor argued to be so deeply embedded 
that they appear natural and unproblematic to us, rather than a set of norms is this 
moral order constitutional (Taylor, 2007, p. 10). Taylor states that it differs from 
theory in this sense, that it is uncontested. But at the same time is it important to 
remember how it has its roots in theory, just like the order before it, was it not 
given by god but formulated by humanity and slowly naturalized. The 
implications for this are huge due to it being a frame for the politically possible 
and that it makes practices and exercises of power legitimate (Taylor, 2007, p. 
23). Even though Taylor’s initial intent is said be of the descriptive kind does he 
also direct a level of critique. Partly does he points out that this one imaginary is 
not only created and situated in a certain place in time, but also in space and a 
neither universal nor eternal. Therefore is a blind acceptance of it as the only 
possible order not just naïve, but even harmful. The first step, is then, argues 
Taylor, what he himself does, to identify it in order for it to be interrogated 
(Taylor, 2007, p. 1). 
Even though on many points different, Taylor and his social imaginary does in 
some ways resemble Foucault and his view of the possible or even knowable, 
discourse (or episteme). Without getting into a deeper discussion on Foucault’s 
ideas of power and knowledge I think it is worthwhile to bring it up as a way of 
understanding and analysing the politically possible. Neumann (2003, p. 157) 
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makes an attempt at a broad definition for this way of approaching knowledge 
through discourse or episteme as follows, “a system which produces a set of 
statements and practices whom through institutional establishment can depict 
themselves as more or less normal”. In other words do these systems of 
knowledge constitute the perception of reality among its bearers and are to some 
extent decisive for different types of social relations. In this sense is discourse 
more a question of epistemology than ontology through its dealings with how 
knowledge is situated and framed. Neumann (2003, p. 158) describes it to be a 
hegemony which is uncontested and appears as natural, not much unlike Taylor’s 
imaginary. However are there differences, partly due to the imaginary which 
Taylor describes being situated in the certain context in space (Europe, North 
America) and time (from the 17th century and onwards) as opposed to discourses 
which can be found anywhere, but also due to differences in scale where Taylor’s 
imaginary is a grand concept on what defines our society that may contain a range 
of discourses. Finally there is the difference in that the discourse is not just theory 
but also a mode of analysis or a method. With the presumption that nothing is 
fundamental but rather representations, the task of discourse analysis is to 
examine action conditions, to study the relation between statement and practice 
(Neumann, 2003, p. 158). In other words, how our perception of reality affects or 
actions in the very same. 
In order to further provide theoretical background and narrow down towards 
to my mode of analysis would I like to bring up another mode of analysis that is 
somewhat related to discourse and discourse analysis, narrative and analysis 
through it. The relation between these two approaches to text, have been discussed 
without a consensus being reached. These discussions touch upon both the scale 
of these notions but also their interrelation. Chatman argues that a narrative 
consists of a story and a discourse, Mottier and Robinson sees the narrative as one 
form of discourse while Barthes looks upon the narrative as totally separated from 
the discourse (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, p. 229). Beneviste makes the 
distinction between discourse and narrative through an argument that the narrative 
ironically enough does not have a narrator. Instead does the events in a narrative 
seem to tell themselves, while the discourse has a clearer power relation and 
therefore a sender of the message (White, 1980, p. 7). This of course said without 
implying the discourse to be arguing for an absolute power notion. As it has been 
hinted throughout the text, is this naturalization of reality is my starting point, and 
perhaps then an argument for swaying towards a narrative analysis rather than the 
more often used discourse analysis. Even the term narrative itself has been 
contested in how much the concept can be stretched and onto what it can be 
applied. Barthes would argue that narrative, much like discourse, can be seen 
almost everywhere and does not limit itself to text or symbols but instead can be 
read through practices and other manifestations. On the opposite side stands, for 
example, van Dijk who has made the argument for a stricter and more formalized 
interpretation of narrative as only a verbal act (Bergström & Boréus, 2005, p. 
234). I would have to confess to the former in so far as I do not believe narratives 
can be confined to certain expressions, since different forms of expression may 
relate to same ideological foundation. Because what can be agreed upon 
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concerning narrative is that it is a way to make a complex world possible to 
comprehend, it creates order, sets a chronology, makes a story that we can 
understand. With this, do actions and practices only become understandable in a 
narrative framing. An argument put forward in favour of this type of analysis is 
that it helps us identify things that might slip past us in a more technical analysis, 
the things taken for granted and uncontested (Bergström &Boréus, 2005, p. 226). 
This of course has to do with narrative analysis having its roots in both 
structuralism and the postmodern field of analysis. Hayden White argues that 
using the narrative analysis is a good way of exposing ideological functions. 
Because, like stated earlier, do the narrative appear as natural, Barthes argues that 
it constitutes rather than show or represent (White, 1984, p. 13). With reference to 
Hegel, White makes the argument that production of history is done in the 
contemporary; that rather than history being found is it put together (White, 1984, 
p. 4). This is what White calls emplotment, a process in which the scientist (often 
in his examples a historian) does create a narrative or a story with the use of 
singular facts or events. In this process, some things are emphasized, others left 
out and all of it put in order (White, 1984, p. 18). Levi-Strauss called history a 
heuristic tool, which, just like in economics, can be used to establish order an 
make sense of the world a long as it is remembered to be just a tool and not a 
perfect truthful account of reality. In this sense he argued that the myth of western 
societies were equal to those of the “savages” that he studied (White, 1984, p. 11).  
In order to move on towards my method I would like to once again point out 
that the reasons for this brief exposé of approaches was to point out the relevance 
in questioning the taken for granted and seemingly natural. It also positions my 
analysis partly somewhere in the vicinity of narrative analysis but most of all does 
it point to the level of abstraction for my study. While certainly important, do I 
not intend to examine the policy process but my aim is for the more deeply 
imbedded ideological assumptions, the building blocks for the theories that 
translate into policy.  
 
 
2.2 Method 
 
In order to answer my question on the continuity in Swedish foreign aid policies I 
would like to apply the concept of myth, or mythology as methodology. Myth is 
of course commonly used in the meaning of stories in which people believe that 
are not true, while the scientific approach is not completely different it requires a 
thorough explanation and definition (Hall, 2006, p. 178). In short is the myth in 
social sciences stories looked upon as true by a group of people, that serve as 
building blocks for identity, purpose and meaning. Flood (2002, p. 44) defines it 
as “an ideologically marked narrative which purports to give a true account of a 
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set of past, present, or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in 
its essentials by a social group”. 
 
2.2.1 Barthes’ myth 
 
The concept of myth has its origin in the French scholar Roland Barthes whom 
draws upon the field of semiology in order to formulate a way to analyse and 
criticize what he calls “mass culture” (Bathes, 2007, p. 7). The point of departure 
for Barthes, and those concerned with myth, is a suspicion towards the natural in a 
reality that is entirely historical, or to be more precise, suspicion towards what 
appears to be natural. Barthes argues that the myth is depoliticized speech, in this 
way is it a statement or a message (Bathes, 2007, p. 9). It is a system of 
communication that is not an object in itself but gives objects meaning (Bathes, 
2007, p. 201). Speech in Barthes sense is not limited to language or text but 
includes signs and practices as well. In accordance with his roots in semiology, 
does Barthes in quite a technical sense draw up how the myth is created in a 
second semiological system, a sort of meta language in which one speaks of the 
first system (Bathes, 2007, p. 207). Both systems consist of three parts, and are 
created in a similar fashion. The first system is made up of a signifier and 
something signified that together creates a sign, a meaning. In the second system 
does the meaning become a form that together with a concept creates a 
signification, the form has the same position as the signifier does in the first 
system (Barthes, 2007, p. 209). The first system is denotative in the sense that it is 
literal and seen as objective. According to semiology it is how we create 
language. An object in itself is signified with a linguistic representation, such as a 
word (signifier) and together do they create the sign. The internal relationship 
between these two is arbitrary, there is for example no reason why the four-legged 
furry animal that some people have in their homes is referred to as “cat”. The 
second system is however connotative and created intentionally where the sign 
(meaning) becomes the signifier and filled with a concept (signified). One of 
Barthes’ examples of this process that is often used is a cover of the magazine 
“Paris match” on which a young black soldier makes a salute. The young black 
man is then the signifier and signified through connotations of Frenchness and 
militarism to express the myth “that France is a great Empire, that all her sons, 
without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under the flag, and that there is 
no better answer to the detractors of an alleged colonialism than the zeal shown by 
this Negro in serving his so-called oppressors” (Barthes, 1991, p. 115) . 
What this means in a more, at least for my purposes, applicable sense is that 
when the meaning becomes form and a part of a second system it is drained of its 
history and become impoverished. It has not changed but is rather hidden or 
supressed and “the meaning loses its value, but keeps its life, on which the form 
of the myth shall live” (Barthes, 2007, p. 210). The fact that the myth is drained or 
impoverished does also mean that it has a mobility or slipperiness that makes it 
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difficult to grasp, its expression can change while it is rooted in the same 
essentials. The myth deprives memory, not existence, it is a sort of alienation in 
which the historically rooted and political becomes natural and depoliticized 
(Barthes, 2007, p. 223). This is the principle of the myth.  
 The process of the myth is however very political in itself and it does 
always to some degree have an intention (Barthes, 2007, p. 219). Since the myth 
eradicates dialectic and doubts, the form of a statement or announcement works 
both in the way that it notifies and points out, makes us understand at the same 
time as it imposes itself on us. Through this does the process of the myth involve 
both a reception and a reproduction (Flood, 2002, p. 43). In order for it to function 
the myth is confined to a certain context in time and space where the 
fundamentals on which it is based are shared and recognized by the social group 
(Prügl, 2012, p. 23; Åhäll, 2012, p. 108). And these fundamentals do not just hold 
the status of truth but paradigmatic truth in the sense that they are so firmly rooted 
that they cannot be questioned with validity. It is through this recognition that the 
myth receives authority and is able to be seen as natural. At the same time as the 
myth is situated in a certain context it cannot be manufactured by anyone out of 
thin air but it is rather an expression of power to be able to make the myth appear 
to be true and natural (Weber, 2009, p. 7). Added to this does Burton (2013, p. 
486) argues that the making of myths is a manner of maintaining a status quo, to 
strip the contemporary of the history leading up to its formation. Barthes constant 
enemy was the French bourgeoisie and the myths that upheld their position in 
society as natural, here I would like to think that the policies on aid and 
development are suitable to be analysed as myth.  
 
2.2.2 Mythology as methodology 
 
So, how and why use this for my study?  If this has served as a basis for the 
concept of the myth I will be drawing on more contemporary readings and 
applications for my approach. These work through a post-modernised Barthes that 
is more suitable when applying the myth to political science rather than culture 
and literature studies. Martin Hall (2006, p. 178) does in his attempt to establish 
an approach towards mythology as methodology suggest that the centrepiece to 
this theory is to read political theories as if they were myths. He argues that this 
should open up for a wide array of critical stances where the important aspect, just 
like Cynthia Weber states, is not to evaluate whether the myths are true or not but 
rather show how they are not natural, but cultural and political creations made to 
appear natural (Hall, 2006, p. 181; Weber, 2009, p. 7). Weber argues that the goal 
of studying theories as myths is to bring them back into the realm of interpretation 
to be able to critically examine them. It is about repoliticizing these naturalized 
facts and through this, focus on how the cultural configurations of power and 
ideology works in the creation of the myth (Weber, 2009, p. 7). This is done by 
Weber in a, in my opinion, very neat way when she critically examines the 
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foundations of the most common IR theories through films. In a similar but in 
approach still different way does Hall show that both the story of realism, with its 
basis in constant fear of anarchy, and the books about Harry Potter are recognised, 
accepted and credible due to their base in the civilization-defining myth of Satan 
(Hall, 2006, p. 182). In this sense, does the myth becomes more of an approach 
than a step-by-step method.  
To relate back to the discussion on narratives and discourse, does Åhäll (2012, 
p. 109), who applies the myth concept on two ideas of motherhood (the vacant 
womb and the deviant womb) in political violence, describes the myth as a meta-
discourse, an umbrella under which different (and perhaps contending) discourses 
fits in while Flood (2002, p. 13) sees it as a form of ideological discourse. The 
core that I believe to be of importance is how the myth is to be read as something 
natural and with the status of paradigmatic truth, what Barthes said to “go without 
saying” (Weber, 2009, p. 4).  
There are however some differences in the actual modus operandi when 
analysing the myth. Barthes did in his most prominent work, Mythologies, try to 
expose or reveal the underlying bourgeoisie ideologies in everyday cultural 
expressions such as fashion magazines, Tour de France, or haircuts in films. This 
approach has been adopted by several scholars of cultural studies as well as by the 
aforementioned Weber, although with a twist. She states that in order to reveal the 
myth’s underlying ideology one must first identify the myth, describe and define 
it and in a second step examine the myth function (Weber, 2009, p. 8). The myth 
function is Weber’s concept of the process that turns ideology into a naturalized 
fact. Weber’s way of doing this is through films where reality is compared to a 
fictional “other world” which helps identifying the myth function, the 
assumptions or truths that make us believe and recognize the story. The IR 
theories that she interrogates and the films circulate the same myths and through 
this does support and reproduce each other. Hall’s way of approaching the myth is 
slightly different and, would I argue, better suited for my purposes. Instead of 
playing on the relationship does Hall, like stated earlier, make the argument that 
both fictional stories and theories of social science are expressions of myths that 
are crucial sources for Western civilization (Hall, 2006, p. 179). This approach 
then leans more towards a genealogical approach in the sense that a backtracking 
through history should make us understand the constitution of today. Hall adopts 
the already mentioned White’s theory of emplotment to identify how stories and 
narratives are created, how interpretations become truth. Emplotment, again, is 
based on the idea that history is a created narrative and that historical events or 
facts are suitable for textual analysis. Through interpretations, establishing of 
timelines and a selection of facts or events is the story of history created (Hall, 
2006, p. 180). In other words does Hall’s mythology as methodology consist of a 
textual analysis in which the researcher attempts to deconstruct a historical 
narrative. White’s concept of emplotment consists of four different stories that can 
be created, comedy, tragedy, satire and romance. I will not apply this theory of 
emplotment but rather track back to Barthes and his seven figures of myth that 
may be used as a heuristic tools or a form of ideal types. Barthes called them 
rhetoric forms and like White’s four different types of narratives “it is through 
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their rhetoric that bourgeois myths outline the general prospect of this pseudo-
physis which defines the dream of the contemporary bourgeois world” (Barthes, 
1991, p. 151). I will here on present them.  
 The first is inoculation, which is acknowledging a smaller evil as temporary 
or accidental for the protection of the greater structure (Barthes, 1991, p. 151). 
One obvious example is that of explaining police violence through a few “rotten 
eggs” as opposed to defining it as a certain consequence of such an institution. 
The second is closely related to the whole concept of myth and is labelled as the 
privation of history. This function deprives the contemporary from its historical 
roots and presents it as natural. The momentarily becomes eternal in the 
perception that things have always been just as they are now.  Third, does Barthes 
bring up identification, which, perhaps contradictory, is the inability to imagine 
the Other. With obvious links to postcolonialism does this mean ignorance or a 
denying of the Other that leads to a reduction to sameness. Either is the Other read 
through oneself or seen as all Others. Barthes states this to be because “the Other 
is a scandal which threatens his existence” (Barthes, 1991, p. 152). The fourth 
figure is tautology, which just like the name suggests is a self-justification and 
occurs due to a loss of explanation. Something is explained or legitimized with 
reference to itself (Barthes, 1991, p. 153). Next, and fifth, is neither-norism that 
balances two alternatives simply to reject them in order to find a middle ground. 
In the process are the two stripped of content and reduced to analogies in order for 
the equilibrium to be upheld. In a similar fashion is the sixth conceived, which is a 
quantification of quality. Particulars that in essence may be separate are 
economized and measured on the same scale, things are in this sense made 
comparable. Barthes states how this figures lies latently in all previous figures 
(Barthes, 1991, p. 154). The final figure is the statement of fact, which much like 
privation of history is closely linked with the very principle of Barthes’ myth. He 
distinguishes them by defining this statement as language-object as opposed to the 
myth being meta-language. In other words do the statement of fact take an 
instrumental grasp of the world as object and paves way for action. It is “speech 
of a humanity which is making itself, not one which is”. The one that already is 
and therefore in its function does “bury the traces of this production under a self-
evident appearance of eternity” is the meta-language and the actual myth (Barthes, 
1991, p. 155).  
To conclude do these figures provide some guidance and help in identifying 
the expressions of the myth in the textual analysis of development policies. The 
fundamentals for my study are, once again, how theories, and therefore policies 
can be read as anchored in myths and are accepted and legitimized through 
recognition and a common sense. This further supports the initial approach that 
however myths are actually true or not is not importance and even stronger 
cements the idea that there are not “real facts” to be found out there but rather is 
the intent one of exposing and re-politicizing that which has been naturalised. 
Parallels to my method could perhaps be drawn to what Vedung defines as 
functional idea analysis that instead of testing the internal logic or validity of a 
theory is aimed at understanding how an idea became dominant (Beckman, 2007, 
p. 13). Another parallel that can be brought up in relation to the myth is a sort of 
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ideological analysis that Beckman explains to aim at the underlying values and 
judgements of an ideology. This is done through textual analysis that can be made 
on both manifest and latent messages (Beckman, 2007, p. 56). In proximity to this 
Beckman brings up Tingsten’s “idea critique” which, to my understanding differs 
quite a bit from what I am aiming at, but carries with it the idea that “judgements 
of reality play the leading part in ideologies” (Beckman, 2007, p. 65). With this 
nod towards the more mainstream approaches to text analysis I shall turn back to 
my approach and the myth. 
There have been some different views on the possibilities of establishing the 
counter myth or the anti myth. Barthes himself stated how the anti myth was 
poverty stricken and clumsy (Boer, 2011, p. 222) and I would certainly agree with 
Weber’s argument that the re-politization and interrogation is a good enough 
achievement in itself (Weber, 2009, p. 7). However does for example Boer (2011, 
p. 225) argue how the myth in its hiding of ideology also contains the seed of 
rebellion. Even though it is agreed among scholars of the myth that there is no 
essence to be found, this rebellion could be the hidden dialectics or political roots 
that allows for a new (or at least another) myth. The possibility of opposing the 
depoliticizing speech of the myth is then political speech. I would, with this in 
mind, at least point towards an alternative position, another possible narrative.  
2.2.3 Material 
Like stated earlier did Barthes argue that narratives can be found anywhere and 
with this applied his concept of myth on a wide array of cultural expressions. My 
approach, in terms of material, is however a bit more formal and as mentioned I 
follow the, for political science, more applicable guidelines of Hall and Weber 
that is to read political theories like myths. In order to capture the idea of the 
Swedish aid policies I will do a text analysis as defined earlier on the principal 
guiding documents in the area of development. These are the aforementioned four 
propositions that have provided guidelines since the first on was accepted in 1962. 
The remaining three came in 1968, 1978, and 2003 (Wolgemuth, 2012, p. 6). 
Much in line with my argument for the continuity that has been in the Swedish 
foreign aid policies have these document first of all been conceived by 
governments consisting of different parties but have also stood unchanged during 
shifts in government. For these reasons I believe them to be representative of the 
core values that defines foreign aid policies. Even if these would suffice for an 
analysis I will make one addition to bring in the aspect of the international society 
in which Sweden is a part. The UN millennium project report from 2005, 
Investing in development, that evaluates the progress made at the time will also be 
used much due to the 2003 proposition stating a full commitment to the UN 
stipulated millennium goals.  
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3  Foreign aid policy 
So far, the background to the Swedish aid policies and its situation within the 
global context has been described, much to give the premises for this thesis and to 
make an argument for its relevance. In other words is the continuity the argument 
for treating the aid policies as a myth while the first step of the analysis is to 
describe this myth. Although I will not, as stated earlier, completely adopt 
Weber’s methodology will I follow her first step in trying to identify the myth and 
its content in order to start understanding it. This will be done by identifying the 
problems, goals, and actions taken in foreign policies.  
 
3.1 Problems 
Policy starts with a problem, an obstacle to overcome, a situation for which 
political intervention is needed for change to occur, or the equilibrium to be kept. 
In my case of foreign aid and development policies are there a few problems 
posed that should legitimize the policies implemented and I will now try to 
identify them. 
The main problem that is addressed throughout all the propositions is that of 
poverty. This can be seen as the basis for developmental policies, it is evident in 
the first Swedish policy from 1962 (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5) as well as it 
was the beginning of global development policies as stated earlier in Truman’s 
speech. Poverty is however not a simple coherent notion that bears with it only 
one meaning. The different aspects that are expressed in the propositions and what 
makes it a slippery term are mostly those of scale and relation. In part is poverty 
described as a problem for the individual, a poverty that is affecting people’s day 
to day live in terms of not being able provide or gain access to food, health care or 
living accommodations. This is especially evident in the 2003 proposition where 
“improvement of the poor individual’s living conditions” are brought forward as a 
key-point (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 86) Often is this individual poverty 
connected to the absolute measurements of poverty, a poverty in itself. One of the 
millennium goals for example consist of helping people out of the absolute 
poverty as it is defined in living on under one dollar a day (UN millennium 
project, 2005, p. xii). In a similar way does the 1962 proposition 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 7) state the will to abolish hunger while the 2003 
proposition, like just mentioned, emphasizes the perspective of the individual. 
These are expressions of poverty made in an isolated fashion, they suggests 
poverty as something that simply exists among certain individuals and groups. 
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However is the problem of poverty not just stated as a problem for the individual 
but also states are expressed to be poor. This larger scale is however almost 
exclusively stated in relational terms. Through measurements of GDP can it be 
pointed out what states are developed and which are underdeveloped. The 1962 
proposition states that the fundamental problem is “economic underdevelopment” 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5). The problems of the third world are then 
described in a lack of economic growth that leaves them economically dependable 
on external actors. Here does the term economic growth become intertwined with 
economic independence and through this political independence. Because the 
problem for countries in the third world is not just that of poverty but it is also 
stated to be the lack of good governance (UN millennium project, 2005, p. 15). 
Some countries whom are recipients of aid are explained to not be developing due 
to governance failures, at the same time do some countries whom are defined to 
have good governance experience failures to develop because they are too poor to 
help themselves (UN millennium project, p. 20). This particular theory of 
development is called poverty traps which is a sort of catch 22 where it is 
explained how development policies and aid stands before a paradox. Aid is said 
to have the greatest impact where it is not needed and does then work the worst 
where the needs are the biggest. For example is it in 2003 stated how many 
countries lack the competence to formulate good trade policies 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 38).  
So how do these stated problems relate to the donors of aid? This economic 
inequality that I have described is stated to be morally inacceptable, a state of the 
world that is intrinsically negative and therefore legitimizes policies aimed for 
redistribution. In other words should the poor be helped out of solidarity and a 
common human morality, this is held as a strong point in 1962 as well as 2003 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5; Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 7). Just like 
redistributional policies within the state is it a case of basic societal justice. 
This is however not the only argument put forward as to why poverty and 
economic inequality is a problem, economic development is said to be a process 
in which all gains and therefore is economic inequality a problem for everyone 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 6; 1968, p. 5). This problem is in other words one 
of economic inefficiency. It is said to be economic gains in the long term for the 
giving countries if the developing countries achieve economic growth due to them 
opening up as new trading partners and markets (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 
6). This is in the 2003 proposition called “the enlightened self-interest” 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 18). Rather than giving or contributing with aid it 
is often spoken about investing in development, just like the title of the UN report 
(UN millennium project, 2005) halfway into the effort to realise the millennium 
goals. In this way, are the foreign aid policies seen as not isolated but part of 
foreign policies in general that includes both trade as well as security. Economic 
growth is also argued to be contributing to stable societies where the risk of 
conflict or the establishment of extreme groups such as terrorists is lessened 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 79, UN millennium project, 205, p. 7). 
Underdevelopment is here framed as a possible risk, partly for the countries 
concerned but most of all is this an argument for the donors of aid. The 2003 
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proposition states the eradication of poverty to be a condition for peace, stability 
and sustainable development (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 84). 
Despite this great emphasis on poverty, little is said of how this state of the 
world came to be, the origins of this “humanities biggest moral, political and 
economic challenge” (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 84) remains in the shadows. 
The European colonial past is hardly mentioned, especially in the more recent 
documents. In the 1962 proposition it is acknowledged that “under-development” 
has historical and sociological roots but it is only elaborated on in so far as it is 
argued that Western values and developmental patterns cannot simply be applied 
on developing countries (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5). Even more so is 
Sweden’s history of not being directly involved in colonialism argued to provide 
credibility as a donor of aid (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 7). The 1978 
proposition explains the increasing global inequalities since the second world as a 
long historical process that started with the European industrialisation in which 
Europe leaped ahead economically. In comparison it is stated that “only a minor 
amount of developing countries – as independent or colonies - did before the 
second world war reach an economic growth that significantly exceeded the 
population growth” (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 68). While this of course is 
not factually false, it should, at the least, be pointed put how this is a one-sided 
account of the world.   
 
3.2 Goals 
If the problems are stating what is wrong, the goals are quite the opposite. They 
stipulate the good and desirable, sometimes in more utopian terms sometimes 
more pragmatically. One could attempt to make a case of how these goals not 
always correspond with the stated problems but this is as stated not the aim of my 
study. To the extent this is done it is with the intent of pointing to ideological 
assumptions that affects the train of thought.  
The guiding proposition from 1962 states that the foreign aid has the purpose 
of helping the poor peoples to develop economically and socially, and through 
this enabling them to help themselves (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p, 3). The 
goals in 1978 are similar in their strive for economic and social development but 
do put more emphasis on equation of these aspects in the development process. In 
other words, not just growth but also a more equal distribution 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 11). Connected to this is the expression of a 
striving for economic and political independence. The goal of a more equal 
distribution of resources is stated to be important due to the fact that economic 
growth does not necessarily lead to a more just distribution of means. However is 
it, quite contradictory, stated how such equal distribution only can be made 
possible through an increased production (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 80). 
Linked to this is also the stated goal of peace, said to be dependent on a more 
equal distribution of means (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 79). In other words 
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does the goal of economic growth appear to be put first and foremost. The concept 
of economic growth is indeed a slippery one that provides problems both in terms 
of assessing and measuring it but also in its function in development. While the 
economic development is stated as a mean rather than a goal in itself in the 1978 
proposition (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 81) it, as stated earlier, provided the 
core argument for why the industrialised Europe should be regarded as further 
developed than the rest of the world. In the 1962 proposition are the goals stated 
to be to mitigate need, expand trade, provide knowledge and capital 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 3). In a sense could it then be argued that 
economic growth becomes something desirable in itself and therefore a goal. 
While the goals of the earlier propositions have been formulated in what can 
be considered vague, or perhaps soft, terms does the goals of the proposition from 
2003 have another dimension due to them being linked to the UN millennium 
goals that are set in actual numbers. Among these goals are efforts that aim to 
halve the amount of people living in absolute poverty (on under one dollar a day), 
a number that was 1,2 billion at the point in 1990 that stands as index 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 7). Furthermore is universal primary education, 
and so done with total gender equality, one the goals. Other goals consists of a 
decrease in child mortality by two thirds, in maternal death by three fourths and a 
halt and reverse in the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, among them 
malaria (UN millennium project, 2005, p. xii). Finally there are two more loosely 
formulated goals, one ensuring a commitment to environmental sustainability and 
the other promising to develop a global partnership for development (UN 
millennium project, 2005, p. xiii). Again can there be said to be a discrepancy in 
how the problems relate to the goals, or more precisely in what constitutes 
something to be achieved and what are the means to get there. The goals are also 
said to concern all countries, which would legitimize the global partnership more 
indefinitely, but since most industrialized countries already have achieved most 
goals (the global environmental concern being the exception) it really becomes a 
matter of developing the lesser developed countries towards the levels of the 
developed countries. Therefore does the partnership differ in its constitution from 
the other goals; it is a part of the development process rather than an actual goal. 
It should be noted that the goals in no way are set to be utopian but are seen as 
bold but achievable (UN millennium project, 2005, p. xiv). 
Apart from the possible questions about what goals actually answers to the 
problems posed is there another issue that concerns the agenda setting in both the 
processes of identifying problems and setting goals. Throughout the propositions 
is the complexity of the relationship between donor and recipient explicitly 
acknowledged through statements of how western values and patterns of 
development cannot simply be applied to developing countries and that these 
countries own development policies are the undisputed point of departure 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5; 1978, p. 90; 2003, p. 88). Despite this do the 
goals include the already mentioned partnership and are said to preferably be built 
upon a common value framework. The 2003 proposition points out that the aid is 
in some ways conditioned and puts demands on the receiving countries in aspects 
such as policies aimed towards poverty reduction, processes towards democracy 
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and equality, and a strive for a realisation of the human rights 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 89). Even though these values may be argued for 
as universal the power relation becomes apparent. Especially in the light of the 
fact that the long term goal is stated to be independence. 
 
3.3 Action 
The final aspect of my walkthrough of the guiding documents deals with the 
actions taken to achieve said goals and solve the problems identified, it is how 
Sweden positions itself as a donor of aid. I would like to begin by continuing on 
the already mentioned, and somewhat, problematic idea of a partnership. Because 
even though it was stated in the 1962 proposition how patterns of development are 
not easily transferrable, the very same proposition mentions little of the role of the 
recipients of aid. Aid was at this point mainly distributed multilaterally through 
the UN and the argument for this was made with consideration to the power 
relation bilateral aid consists of (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 18). Multilateral 
aid and its implementation would then be conceived more democratically within 
the UN than through two parties in which one may be dependent on the other’s 
good will. There is also an explicit caution towards engaging in social and 
political actions in the proposition and therefore are the efforts channelled within 
the frame of economy (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 7). However is this not to 
be mixed up with a solely monetary donation but actually is a technical aid in the 
form of knowledge transfers through experts argued to be preferable 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p 13).  
In the 1968 proposition is a bigger emphasis put on a unity in the policies through 
both arguments of the efficiency benefits when all parties are heading in the same 
direction but also through the mutual potential gains (Utrikesdepartementet, 1968, 
p. 5). This view on development as a global process in which all take part in the 
partnership has since been even more strongly cemented. However have the aid 
come to be more distributed bilaterally as opposed to the earlier multilateral aid 
(SIDA, 2009). Investing in development states how the matter no longer is 
deciding on what action to take, the political solution exists and that the 
framework for development has been established, what is left is just to realize it. 
This framework is the millennium goals and the global partnership (UN 
millennium project, 2005, p. 1). Apart from this giving implications for the actual 
practices of development is it another indicator as to how naturalised the view on 
development has been. In relation to the millennium goals is foreign aid 
mentioned as one of the most important aspects, and more precisely is it an 
exhortation for countries to meet the UN recommended level of 0,7 percent of 
GDP (UN millennium project, 2005, p. xvi). Like mentioned in the introductory 
part of this thesis have this approach to development and aid been one of the 
strongest points in the Swedish policies. However does this only provide the 
frame for in which different policies are formed. Throughout the propositions has 
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a connection been made between aid and policies on trade. In the 1962 
proposition is an expansion of trade stated as one of the main goals along with a 
mitigation of the needs and knowledge transfers (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 
3). The economic growth that is often used as an indicator of development is to 
come from export oriented trade in a free market. Protectionism and other forms 
of restrictions on trade are said to be harmful and economically inefficient 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 67), while economic growth is possible through 
an integration in the international economic system (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, 
p. 11). Despite this is it recognized how even the free market needs restrictions 
and rules that should be fair and open.  
In 1978 did this trade oriented integration in some ways take the form of 
bound aid, some of the aid given by Sweden was restricted to a selection of 
Swedish products and services (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 110). Something 
the receiving countries were critical of and a practice that in the light of the free 
market can be argued to be inefficient. This goes along with the overall idea that 
aid is something to be invested in, which implicates a future gain for the donor. In 
the 2003 proposition is a higher degree of migration argued for as something to 
help make connections and matches in the market from which all should gain. The 
positive aspects for the recipients of aid are argued to be access to a global market 
and cheaper goods (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 16). Again is this put in 
contrast to the stagnating effects of protectionism. The view on partnership and 
global unity in the development process does not only mean a commitment to 
economic growth through production and trade but also implications on the view 
on economic growth. In the 1962 proposition there is no conflict between the 
growth of the developed countries and those developing, rather the opposite as it 
is stated how the global economic situation affects all (Utrikesdepartementet, 
1962, p. 11). Therefore is an economic expansion positive for all, since it creates 
the resources to stimulate even the least developed countries. Similar ideas are 
expressed in 2003 where it is brought forward how the richest countries made the 
commitment to increase efficiency and volume in the developmental work to 
enable other investments and trade (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 14). The role 
of private actors and companies as distributors of knowledge and economic 
growth is recognized as growingly important (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 91). 
Related to the issue of economic growth and that of partnership is the topic of 
debt. Since some of the globally given aid has been in the form of loans and 
investments on which the richer countries have expected a return or payback 
many of the third world countries are heavily indebted. Some of these debts have 
been deprecated through the HIPC-initiative but the 2003 proposition argues how 
this only is effective if it is done as a part of a development strategy 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 44). Therefore  do these depreciations come with 
clear demands on domestic policy to avoid the countries to again find themselves 
in the same situation. 
Finally would I like to bring up one last element of the actions taken and 
suggested that has been present in all documents. This is how the biggest role is 
played by the third world countries themselves, that their development can only 
come from their own strivings and efforts (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5; 
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2003, p. 16). Therefore should the aid given be incorporated within the recipients’ 
own domestic politics. An example of this is the 1978 initiative towards 
something called “country programing”. Despite it’s top down connotation this is 
argued for through the intent of establishing a unity in the direction of 
development but with the departure point in a unquestioned respect for every 
countries sovereignty and their own development policies (Utrikesdepartementet, 
1978, p. 96). The 2003 proposition states how there often are unrealistic 
expectations on the effects possible by external initiatives, such as aid. Instead is 
the responsibility argued to lie with each government. In relation to this is the 
connection between economic growth and good governance brought forward. 
How economic growth is a necessity but does not automatically lead to a more 
equal distribution. The role of government is instead emphasized as crucial for 
equality to be possible (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 16). While these views are 
expressed there can also be argued to be some discrepancies in all these guiding 
documents. Because just like mentioned in relation to, for example debts, is the 
aid not given without conditions. The 2003 propositions suggests Sweden not only 
to be better at listening but also setting demands (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 
7). Just like in 1962 is it in 2003 the intent that aid should lead to independence, 
something not yet achieved. In the 1978 proposition (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, 
p. 74) is a suspicion directed towards the internal policies of developing countries 
and one of the most important aspects of the 2003 proposition is a stronger 
emphasis on results and evaluation in order to asses whether the aid has been used 
properly or not (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 74; 2003, p. 92). Two popular 
explanation to the difficulties to grow economically have already been mentioned,  
governance failures and poverty traps. In some ways these two views on 
development can be seen as contradictory but they still become subjects to the 
same treatment, policies aimed towards a global economic integration, export 
oriented trade and bureaucratic institutions.  
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4 The myth 
I will argue that there are two main concepts that are crucial for the way that 
foreign aid policy is formulated and seen as legitimate, the Eurocentric conception 
of linear development and the conception that development mainly is an economic 
process, both in its goals and practices. Both these concepts are intertwined, 
particularly prominent within liberal thought and would I argue fundamental for 
our western modern understanding of the world. At the same time are neither of 
these eternal values but products of a break with a former order that used to help 
us define society and ourselves. The breaks, which I in more detailed will define, 
are that from Aristotelian teleology to a secular infinite ditto and that from a 
mercantilist zero-sum understanding of economy to that of absolute production 
growth.  
 
4.1  Linear development 
Development suggests movement; it is getting from one point to another. 
However are these points not arbitrary but development does rather stipulate a 
relationship between them, in this sense is development progress. It is moving 
from one state to a better one. This can also be said to be the most fundamental 
reason for giving aid, as a way to help a country or people to progress 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 3). It is expressed throughout the propositions in 
different values, it is done in terms of economy, democracy, independence and 
knowledge (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 11; 2003, p. 7). While this may be the 
common way of understanding the concept of development today, this has not 
always been the case. Both Rist (2008, p. 43) and Isbister (2006, p. 36) point to 
how there with the enlightenment was a break in our conception of teleology and 
therefore development. The earlier Aristotelian teleology and order was 
characterized by its circularity, history was understood as repetition, as constant 
rises and falls, as growth and decay (Rist, 2008, p. 31). As Isbister (2006, p. 33) 
argues does such a conception of teleology not promote development in the sense 
that we understand it, but instead does the circularity lead to the desirable being to 
imitate one’s ancestors. This can be argued to show on several levels. In a way 
does the circular notion of history give implications for another conception of 
society in which family or other minor collectives are much more important 
political entities, in another can the renaissance’s longing for the greatness of the 
antique be understood (Rist, 2008, p. 35). What then happens with the break from 
this understanding is that history is understood without an end or perfection but 
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instead as infinity. Rist (2008, p. 40) argues that with this lies the “idea of a 
natural history of humanity”, which is development that “corresponds to a 
‘natural’ principle with its own source of dynamism”. The implications for this 
are many. In part does it suggest history as cumulative and directional, that 
humanity progresses from savage to civilized but also that every stage is better, 
improved (Rist, 2008, p. 39). When history is viewed upon in this way does a 
certain uniformity or sameness emerge. If the history of humanity is both 
cumulative and directional it implicates development as one single path, as one 
history with a starting point sometime long ago upon which processes of 
knowledge production, growing material welfare and a constant civilizing of 
humanity is added (Isbister, 2006, p. 36). 
It also places the process of development with the individual in a way that, 
Isbister (2006, p. 35) argues, is closely connected with productivity and working. 
The already introduced Taylor (2007, p. 73) connects the protestant values and 
work ethics in what he describes to be our modern imaginary, to this notion of 
production. This has the implication on development, that it is then understood as 
an achievement by devotion and a progression made through strivings. The 
individualism takes its expression in both an assumption that the individual (or on 
a larger scale, the individual state) is responsible for its own development but also 
that the development of one such individual does not stand in conflict with that of 
another. Quite the opposite does this individual growth create mutual gains that 
enables an easier or quicker development of others (Isbister, 2006, p. 40). I use the 
term responsible to point out and emphasize how development within this “natural 
history of humanity” is not really considered an option but a necessity, it becomes 
the only way in which history moves forward, through progression forward and 
improvement in infinity (Rist, 2008, p. 39). Kant did in this way consider the 
development from a state of nature to a social contract a categorical imperative 
(Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 229). Much in line with the previously expressed ideas 
of individualism did he also argue that society is propelled by individuals’ 
unsocial sociability, a self-interest that, while maybe not admirable in itself, is 
necessary for society and its development. This is especially evident in his 
rejection of what he referred to as the “pastoral state”, a stagnant society without 
movement or progression (Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 230). Worth noticing already 
here (and to be more thoroughly explored in the next chapter) is the resemblance 
between Kant’s unsocial sociability and Smith’s basic assumption of an economic 
natural order being formed through each member’s self-love.  
If history is seen as movement along one single path this would implicate the 
possibility of measuring development, to see who has gotten the furthest. By 
defining someone as less developed than oneself does this then legitimize oneself 
as a helper, as an authority with more knowledge in the process of development.  
The aid is aimed at creating economic and political independence 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 89), an independence that is, without being 
explicitly stated, understood to be evident in the countries that gives aid. 
Interestingly enough does this also point to a contradiction in the understanding of 
development, because the infinity of development is seen as for a moment being 
put on hold. The most obvious expression of this would be the terminology of 
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“developed” and “underdeveloped”, since being developed suggests finality and 
perfection while the underdeveloped are still in motion. However does not this, 
like I  will discuss later on, implicate a settling down or stagnation in terms of 
reaching a finality among the self-proclaimed developed countries but rather is it 
an expression of a stadial look upon development But what it does is to establish a 
dichotomy between countries in need of aid and those able to give it, between 
independent and dependent. Especially poverty is described in this fashion, 
through comparison between the normal and the deviant (Escobar, 2011, p. 41). 
This is the earlier discussed relative understanding of the economy in which 
poverty is then seen as something pathological, much like a disease, which gives 
implications for “treatments” that are technical rather than political. The problems 
do then become understood as internal and individual rather than structural 
(Escobar, 2011, p. 110). This is in part expressed in the explanation models of 
“poverty traps” or “governance failures” (UN development project, 2005, p. 15ff) 
but also in the will to “exterminate poverty”. What this is, is then both a process 
of othering (Åhäll, 2012, p. 112), a defining of the different as deviant, as an 
incomplete version of the self and an expression of the individualism in the 
conception of development. Just as it is stated in the 1978 proposition 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 68) that Europe developed rapidly with the 
process of industrialisation and that the rest simply could, or would, not keep up.  
Rist (2008, p. 43) argues that by establishing a dichotomous conception of the 
state of development did the western countries not only create an image of the 
other countries future but also a “de-facto solidarity” by expressing this linearity 
normatively. The solidarity and the moral obligation are expressed to be among 
the strongest reasons for at all establishing aid policies throughout all propositions 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5; 1978, p. 79; 2003, p. 7). The argument is that 
since Sweden is more developed and better off, and has got the ability to help by 
sharing our wealth should this be done. With this argument is the receiving 
countries deprived of their history and reduced to an incomplete version of the 
contributor (Rist, 2008, p. 43).  I would like to point out how solidarity not 
automatically renders a paternalistic expression of power, quite contrary is it 
many instances admirable. However is it in the propositions a mix-up of relative 
and absolute notions that leads to a legitimization through indisputable values, 
something Rist (2008, p. 233) argues to be common in the development discourse. 
Policies formulated in a relative notion of development (us, the developed must 
help them, the underdeveloped) are legitimized through absolute issue of 
starvation and disease. A genuine solidarity does then unconsciously incorporate a 
linear conception of development. 
I would argue that these ideas are expressed through two of Barthes figures of 
myth that help maintaining the status quo. The creation of the world as 
dichotomous could be understood as identification, the inability to identify the 
Other (Barthes, 1991, p. 152). Just like Barthes defines this does the Other only 
become understood through the self and this understanding is then only a 
relational. This process is one of simplification that is evident in the guiding 
documents. In this sense is it partly a reduction of the Other’s subjectivity to 
someone to “do development” upon but also a reduction in so far as a grand and 
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diverse group become seen as one, as “underdeveloped”. The other figure I would 
argue to be present here is inoculation, the admitting of smaller evils or failures 
and the understanding of these as partial or individual in order to keep the larger 
structure (Barthes, 1991, p, 151). Governance failures and poverty traps do 
suggest, both in the explanations and in the semantics, the faults to be with the 
individual and almost accidental. This could be put in contrast to a postcolonial 
reading, or one through dependency theory, that would explain these “failures” 
through the history of colonialism or the exploitive nature of the global economic 
system. Again, is my concern not to point to the right explanation but rather find 
the ideological foundations upon which legitimacy is built and the propositions 
are not preoccupied with questions of guilt nor structural explanations. 
This way of looking upon history and development can, at the least, be said to 
be Eurocentric in the way European values are used to define progress and the 
state of the world (Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 214). However does this not 
necessarily define political action within this order. Hall and Hobson (2010, p. 
216) makes the argument there are two distinguishable different approaches 
within this Eurocentric liberalism, one paternalistic and one anti-paternalistic. In 
both is the, so far described, linear look upon history foundational but it gives 
different implications for intervention. The paternalistic approach, which is 
exemplified through (among others) scholars Cobden and Mill, does not only 
advocate political intervention but deems it necessary. The argument is then that 
all countries and peoples may progress (and then only progress along the same 
path as Europe) however not from own aspirations but with European assistance 
(Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 217). These views did legitimize the paternalistic 
practices of imperialism and colonialism, for example through the notions of 
“white man’s burden” and “terra nullius”. White man’s burden would then be the 
idea that with development and civilization comes the responsibility to educate 
and progress the underdeveloped savages and barbarians (Isbister, 2006, p. 98), 
while terra nullius is the concept that an empty or inefficiently used piece of land 
may be ceased and cultivated efficiently (Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 215). The other 
approach, in which Kant and Smith are two of the most prominent scholars, do 
reject these imperialistic practises both on basis of morality and with the argument 
of them being more harmful than productive since all people eventually will 
evolve towards the “spirit of commerce” (Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 226ff). 
However do this anti-paternalistic stance extend even further to a rejection of all 
forms of paternalism. Even though one of Hall’s and Hobson’s (2010, p. 242) 
conclusions is how the paternalistic wing is more prominent today through 
practices that resemble those of foreign aid (such as the spreading of democracy, 
humanitarian intervention and extensions of the liberal market) would I argue that 
the Smith’s and Kant’s thoughts are those most prominent in the guiding 
documents of Swedish aid policy. Perhaps does this come down to the definition 
of the term “paternalistic” and whether development policies and foreign aid can 
be defined as such.  
Both Smith and Kant are proponents of trade as means of material growth and 
progress through self-interest and competition. It is even stated by Kant how it has 
an “informal civilizing impact” that “helps push all societies towards capitalism 
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and republicanism, which in turn constitute crucial preconditions for a future 
perpetual peace” (cited in Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 227). The perpetual peace that 
is a major point in Kant’s thought is the cosmopolitan society in which all are 
living in infinite possibilities of prosperity under the social contract. The peace is 
though threatened as long as one nation or state have not reached or joined this 
last stage of development (Hall & Hobson, 2010, p. 2319. To pick up a thread 
earlier left to hang is it here important to distinguish how this stadial look upon 
development does not contradict a history of human progress in infinity. For Kant 
does the perpetual peace only provide the means to prosper in infinity (Hall & 
Hobson, 2010, p. 233), similarly can both Rostow’s theory on the stages of 
development (where the society of mass-consumption is the final order) (Isbister, 
2006, p. 38) or Fukuyama’s end of history (as he argued that liberalism had 
prevailed ideologically after the fall of the Soviet union) (Weber, 2010, p. 108) be 
understood within this liberal stadial paradigm. Despite the anti-paternalistic 
approach did Kant in light of the aspects of security consider it legitimate to urge 
others to join the cosmopolitical partnership of the perpetual peace (Hall & 
Hobson, 2010, p. 231). Along these lines did Kant propose drawing up treaties in 
favour of using violence and paternalism and this does then (if not already) 
become a matter connected to power and how it is defined. In other words could 
such practices as those proposed by Kant be argued to be expressions of coercive 
power. For example does McFarlane (2006, p. 44) with reference to Blunt and 
McEwan argue that western knowledge production cannot be separated from 
western power.  Without this leading to me claiming Kant to be paternalistic (on 
the contrary do I appreciate the distinction pointed out by Hall and Hobson) 
would I argue that Kant’s ideas may be present in policies argued to be formulated 
in a paternalistic fashion.  
Several ideas along his lines are evident in the propositions on developmental 
policies. First of all is it throughout the propositions emphasised how the foreign 
aid is not a one-way process of giving but rather have the form of a cooperation, 
especially in the 2003 proposition is this apparent where (with reference to the 
eight millennium goal) the establishing of a global partnership is this brought 
forward as important for the development process (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 
7). In part can this be understood as an argument of efficiency, that the partnership 
implicates a uniformity in the strivings for development through a social contract. 
However would I argue this to primarily derive from a Eurocentric linear liberal 
conception of development, that the direction of development is not even a 
question but what is said to be important is to head there as efficiently as possible. 
Apart from the uniformity in direction, can Kant’s view upon peace be argued to 
appear in the thoughts promoting the global partnership in the propositions. Like 
mentioned earlier is poverty and “underdevelopment” stated to be sources of 
instability, conflict and extremist groups (UN millennium project, 2005, p. 7). 
Apart from this being another indication of how the policies on aid display values 
evident within liberalism does this security concern once again show how the self-
interest is present in the formulation of policy. 
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4.2 Economy 
I have mentioned before how the poor third world came to be seen as a group after 
the second world war. And as discussed in the previous chapter was this new look 
upon the world as consisting of poorer and richer countries what translated into 
developed and underdeveloped.  What earlier had been seen by west as a wide 
array of non-European countries and colonies was both “discovered” as poor and 
created in contrast to the industrialised west as the third world, or the 
underdeveloped (Escobar, 2011, p. 21). In other words is this the earlier 
mentioned process of othering, to discursively create the Other through yourself. 
This was the starting point and is still what poses the most fundamental function 
of foreign aid, richer countries directing economic funds towards poorer countries. 
In this sense is the economy fundamental for understanding developmental policy. 
In the 1962 proposition, it is stated that the problem, which development policies 
should address is economic underdevelopment  and in the 2003 proposition is the 
global economic inequality the main reason for the developmental policies and the 
foreign aid (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 5; 2003, p. 7). The aid, then, has the 
intent of “helping the poor peoples to develop economically and socially and 
thereby helping themselves” (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 3). As I have 
described is economic growth seen as foundational for development to occur and 
for processes of greater economic equality and peace to be possible. The foreign 
aid has the intent to build an economic base for independence and in the 2003 
proposition is it stated how sustainable economic growth is needed in all societies 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 11; Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 11). 
  However is the connection between economic growth and a conception of 
progress not automatic or necessary but is instead, would I argue, a consequence 
of the linear understanding of development. Escobar (2011, p. 24) argues that if 
the problem is defined as a lack, it leads to the cure being formulated in terms of 
growth. The connection appears as natural if more is understood as better, if 
history is seen as cumulative and directional along a single path. It is then not only 
a possibility but a necessity (Rist, 2008, p. 16). Just like I in the previous chapter 
argued for how this stadial look upon development creates a dichotomy that gives 
mandate to “develop someone”, does this provide the argument for giving aid.  
Bogdan (2014, p. 3) points out how an important break in our perception of 
the economy happened in the 18th century with Adam Smith and his antagonism 
towards the mercantile school. What earlier had been the dominating idea, that of 
the mercantile system, consists of a conception that the economic system as a 
zero-sum game. Along with an idea of a strong state lies emphasis on a positive 
trade balance, achieved by a heavily subsidized export and trade barriers that 
restrict import . The logic behind this is an idea of wealth being defined by specie, 
mainly silver and gold, and therefore a will to accumulate through export 
(O’Connor, 2004, p. 31). Smith’s does on the other hand state that through the 
free market, trade and a division of labour are absolute gains possible (O’Connor, 
2004, p. 18). Even though Smith engaged in critique of the mercantilist system 
something important to remember about his theory is how it is not only presented 
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as a rationalisation or a proposition towards efficiency but rather spoken of as the 
natural order of things (Dobb, 1978, p. 39). The often-cited “invisible hand” of 
Smith is in its fundamentals an order that is a function of the human nature. 
Smith’s argument is that man, and therefore society, is propelled forward by the 
self-interest or even self-love present in every individual (Dobb, 1978, p. 38). This 
is obviously very much the same understanding of development and progress as 
the one that Kant expresses, that the unsocial sociability that leads to competition 
propels society forward.  In the civil society does this natural driving force lead to 
the formation of a market, a naturally conceived order, which is defined by its 
circulation of goods by demand (Rist, 2008, p. 18). Taylor (2007, p. 76) argues 
how this new economy defined by exchange and interaction, as opposed to older 
more self-sufficient local systems or the mercantile state-lead and production 
oriented mode of production, had implications for society in general. It 
contributed to the formation of a public sphere and through this a new 
understanding of the individual as atomised, impersonal and independent. In a 
way is this a move towards democracy and equality as “organized society is no 
longer equivalent to the polity” (Taylor, 2007, p. 76). Through the self-interest 
must all rely on all for society to function, Smith described this as “all men 
working for each other in the belief of working for themselves”. The division of 
labour leads to a greater efficiency due to everyone being able to specialize in 
one’s respective trade and through this is economic growth possible . Also does 
this division of labour in the market even more affirm the individual 
understanding of development in the sense that that there is no contradiction 
between different actors economic growth but rather does this specialization lead 
to mutual gains (Pålsson Syll, 2011, p. 48). This way of perceiving trade was later 
adopted by David Ricardo in his theory of comparative advantages, in which 
specialization among countries with the intent of trade leads to absolute gains for 
both parties that would not have been possible with a production directed towards 
self-sufficiency and autarky, such as proposed by the mercantile school 
(O’Connor, 2004, p. 34). 
Many of the aspects of a Smithean conception of economy are present in the 
propositions that provide the guidelines for foreign aid policy and especially on 
the implementation side of the policies. Just like with the development processes 
in general do the propositions in the economic aspects express a Eurocentricity 
that takes both paternalistic and anti-paternalistic expressions. The major point 
that runs through both the earliest and latest proposition is the need for integration 
in the global economic system, only then can economic and political 
independence be achieved (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 11). The idea does to a 
large degree resemble the partnership most advocated for in the 2003 proposition. 
In the 1962 proposition is increased trade expressed as a goal with reference to it 
being a good opportunity for underdeveloped countries to grow economically 
through export (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 4). In a similar fashion is it in 
1978 stated that the common interest must be the uniting force in the global 
economic system (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 67). Added to this is how 
common rules must be established to avoid conflicts and protectionism. The, 
perhaps seemingly contradictory, approach that independence only may be 
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achieved through integration into the economic system is present in Smith (and 
Ricardo) with the idea of mutual gains through a division of labour. By the same 
mechanism by which the social contract (and Kant’s perpetual peace) is 
constructed, that of freedom within the treaty, is it argued that free trade can 
provide the economic growth necessary for political independence 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 44). So what the arguments for trade and an 
export-oriented production among the recipients of aid really is, is Smith’s notion 
of a functioning natural order through the self-interest of all.  
Taylor does grant this individual market the status as one of the cornerstones 
in our modern imaginary. He also connects it to the protestant values that are 
prominent in Weber’s account of the emergence of capitalism, however is Taylor 
more cautious of the causal mechanisms in this process. What he does give credit 
to is though the voluntary aspects of individualism in protestant ethics, this in is 
part related to his notion of sovereignty in the imaginary as a conscious 
acceptance of the social contract, but does also have implications on the 
development for the individual (Taylor, 2007, p. 62). Because even if production 
and the gains of economic growth is made possible through the market and 
interaction with other actors does the protestant notion of individuality lead to 
seeing actors as islands, ultimately responsible for their own situation. Like I 
pointed out in the previous chapter does this provide a legitimacy for the two 
simultaneous approaches of solidarity and “the enlightened self-interest” in the 
sense that the contributor’s of aid own economic growth in no way is seen to be in 
conflict with that of the recipients (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 83, 
Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 85). Perhaps is this best expressed in the 1978 
proposition where it is stated how the aid should be regarded as an industrial 
cooperation rather than a one-sided process of giving (Utrikesdepartementet, 
1978, p. 60). One part of the implementation of these policies was the bound 
commodity aid, something that meant a selection of Swedish commodities for the 
recipients to choose from. It is acknowledged in the proposition how the receiving 
countries were against this concept but the gains were said to be the jobs created 
in the domestic Swedish production sector. Related to this did the already 
mentioned processes of land programming have an important part in the 1978 
proposition, an approach that despite its name was said to have its indisputable 
starting point in the receiving countries sovereignty and development policies 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 96). Odén (2006, p. 153) states how this actually 
was not the case but rather did the contributor have the final saying in the process 
of land programming. This points to some possible contradictions or problems in 
the individualistic conception of development in relation to equality and once 
again is the concept of paternalism relevant. This is both due to the material 
distribution still being unequal and the discursive formation, that Rist (2008, p. 
74) argues to be a dichotomy that cannot be read as two binaries but instead as 
complete and incomplete. These inequalities generate an unequal process of 
agenda setting and implementation, that for example is showing in the richer 
countries being able to make demands in relation to their solidarity.  An example 
of this is the debts of the third world that still do exist. In the beginning of the 
2000s was some efforts directed towards alleviations of this economic hindrance 
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through the HIPC-initiative (heavily indebted poor countries) but the power 
relations became apparent. In the 2003 proposition is it explained how a debt 
reduction only is effective if it is done within a development plan and the idea of a 
responsibility to develop in accordance with the liberal linear view becomes 
obvious. In similar fashion is some of the aid conditioned towards policies in the 
direction of poverty reduction, democratization and a commitment to the human 
rights (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 89).  
I would here like to argue that another figure of myth becomes apparent in the 
documents, one that could be argued to be present in several expressions but 
perhaps most prominently in the notion of poverty and in relation to the debts of 
the third world. The figure is privation of history, which lies close with the myth’s 
depoliticizing aspects and is a denying of the historical foundation upon which the 
contemporary stands (Barthes, 1991, p. 152). The contemporary order is looked 
upon as eternals and without conflict. Like I have stated is the processes of 
colonialism and exploitation leading up to the west being materially superior 
hardly mentioned in the propositions but rather is the self-made industrialized 
Europe pointed to (Utrikesdepartementet, 1978, p. 68). Without such an 
explanation is then the question of guilt not relevant and the solidarity that is the 
reason for giving foreign aid provided with a more loose concept of humanity.  
What this rejection of history and individualism also mean, in line with 
Smith’s argument of specialization, is that economic growth in one country is not 
seen as problematic for another (as would be the case in dependency theory). 
Rather on the contrary is in the 1962 proposition stated how a recession in the 
global economy would harm all and therefore should productivity be kept up 
(Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 11). This does much resemble the at the time 
popular theories of “trickle-down” effects, that economic growth in the richest 
countries will spread to the countries that are lesser off (Binns et. al., 2008, p. 99). 
Such theories have since been heavily criticized and in the 2003 proposition it is 
actually expressed how at times there will have to be a trade-off between rising 
out own standard of living or contributing to others (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, 
p. 86). This is of course part of the basic argument for giving foreign aid at all, a 
total commitment to one’s own efficient development and economic growth 
would probably lead to a rejection of giving in favour of trade. With this said are 
still the trickle-down argument present in the very same proposition when it is 
said how technological transfers can enable the poorest countries to skip some 
steps of development (Utrikesdepartementet, 2003, p. 90). Once again is it 
possible to distinguish the linearity in development as well as the Eurocentric 
vantage point, even more interestingly does this suggest both a stadial approach to 
development as well as a mobility. The stadial approach is apparent in Smith (and 
Kant) and is like a argued in the previous section not contradictory to an infinite 
conception of development but does rather express the final frame in which 
development can infinitely progress.  
I have briefly mentioned Walt Rostow and his stadial look on development but 
think that he is very relevant in relation to the idea of a leap in development. His 
Anti-communist manifesto sketches out the five stages of development from a 
stagnant, constantly under-developed stage of traditional society to the final age of 
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mass-consumption (Isbister, 2006, p. 37) This could be said to be a liberal take on 
Marx’s conception of history and development that indeed also is linear, 
Eurocentric and pointing to infinity. However is the third stage the most 
interesting since it signifies the biggest change, that of the take-off phase. Much 
like the idea of the third world countries jumping ahead or catching up does this 
indicate a phase where the leap from traditional to modern is taken (Rist, 2008, p. 
94). In a European context would this be the industrial revolution that started in 
Great Britain and spread through Europe and what it suggests is development to 
be both geared by and measured through economy and production. The idea of a 
developmental or economic take-off is also expressed by economist Gunnar 
Myrdal, who in his time argued how the poor countries just needed a “big push” 
to get a production going that would enable progression and independence (Odén, 
2006, p. 50). These ideas of a push or a catalyst to get the process of development 
going are evident is the 1962 proposition as it is argued how the stagnating trend 
in the third world countries must be broken so that the living standards can be 
improved (Utrikesdepartementet, 1962, p. 7).  
Finally am I going to point out another figure of myth that, I would say to be, 
present throughout the conceptions of development and especially in the aspects 
of economy and economic progress. The figure is quantification of quality and the 
most fundamental aspect of it is to treat or express what is different in kind as 
different in scale (Barthes, 1991, p. 154). This is how the conception of the linear 
development and the simplification of measuring it through economic progress 
provides the foundation for speaking of countries in terms of developed and 
underdeveloped. It is a process of economisation in which everything can be 
measured and valued.  
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5 Final discussion 
 
 
5.1 Alternatives 
After attempting to both display and explain the Swedish foreign aid policies as 
political myth and how certain aspects of how they are understood and 
approached are uncontested, would I like to point to some different 
understandings and approaches. The reasons for this are partly to even more show 
how the way development is understood today is not the only one but also to nod 
in the direction of possible different ways forward after interrogating the common 
understanding of development. It is worthwhile to once again point to how these 
are possible alternatives and just like with the analysis of the policies that are 
today is not the intent to make judgement on right or wrong.  
McFarlane (2006, p. 44) argues how western knowledge is inseparable from 
western power and in order to move forward is it necessary to understand how 
subaltern knowledge is produced. In the processes and networks of development 
is this often forgotten and the top-down doctrines take the form of certainties that 
are not contested and development does then become technical as opposed to 
political (McFarlane, 2006, p. 36). This is very much in line with the thought of 
postcolonialist scholar Gayatri Spivak, that is aimed at understanding subaltern 
knowledge. She argues that her role as researcher is to develop writing styles that 
allows the subaltern to speak uninterrupted instead of being interpreted or spoken 
for (McFarlane, 2006, p. 45). The reasons for this are to engage in “cultural and 
psychological warfare” from within the master discourse with the intent of 
dissolving it (Kapoor, 2002, p. 652). Fellow postcolonialist Homi Bhabha argues 
along similar lines through his notion of hybridity as an opposition towards the 
dichotomy that today dominates the understanding of development (Kapoor, 
2002, p. 651). What it is about is the right to signify, an agency in the 
performative aspects of knowledge. Through this does Bhabha speak of  “time-
lags”, a way to re-construct other kinds of narratives and denying modernity’s 
linearity and teleology (Kapoor, 2002, p. 655). The idea with this approach to 
development is then not to contest the truth claims of the master discourse but 
rather expose it and situate it, not very unlike my own modest aspirations of this 
thesis.  
One of the actual attempts to this kind of other or alternative development 
does Escobar (2011, p. 95) suggest to find in different expressions of resistance to 
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the master discourse, to write the history of the subaltern, explained by its own 
logic. What this would render in is then “local models in hybridization with the 
global”, an opening for different modes of production (Escobar, 2011, p. 99). In 
other words is this approach to development committed to a sort of plurality, Rist 
(2008, p. 135) describes it as a multitude of centres. However does this break with 
the old conception of development not come without its problems, especially 
since the material distribution in the world is as skewed as it is today. The 
problems then of embracing a notion of hybridity and heterogeneity would be that 
it could leave the structures of power untouched. Mohanty (2003, p. 968) 
describes a similar in process in relation to gender issues where a discursive 
dissolving of the gender dichotomy before actually reaching gender equality 
would only help legitimizing the order. It would then be a process much like how 
the individual notion of development does remove the historical processes that 
lead up to the situation of inequality today. However should these concerns be 
limited to a critical evaluating to the effects and not a rejection argues Rist (2008, 
p. 138) while pointing to the reigning doctrines of development are themselves at 
least as flawed and problematic. He draws, in a constructive attempt, up the 
possibilities for a concept of self-reliance as an opposition to global development, 
not as an abstract model but, much like Escobar (2011, p. 95) proposed, as a 
historical process of struggle (Rist, 2008, p. 134). Self-reliance is a commitment 
to using democratically controlled local factors of production and establishing a 
material sufficiency. At the same time is it not a resorting to autarky but instead a 
more locally anchored production process. It is a counter-move against 
development practices such as directing the majority of production and 
manufacturing of, often, raw materials that have no societal demand except for 
trade (Isbister, 2006, p. 44). One of the major points with such an approach is how 
development cannot be imposed from above but rather is a process of struggle and 
emancipation (Rist, 2008, p. 134). 
These ideas are perhaps taken the furthest by postcolonialist Franz Fanon and 
his Hegelian approach to colonialism. Through this this dichotomy of Master and 
Slave does he argue that any form of aid or solidarity from the west (Master) 
towards the colonised (Slave) are counter-productive and only a new expression 
of the same power relationship (Fanon, 1997, p. 195). The relation can only be 
dissolved with the Slave’s uprising and emancipation through violence (Fanon, 
1997, p. 177). In the foreword to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth does Sartre point 
to how not just the active coloniser but everyone who gains from the colonial 
process passively bears guilt (Sartre, 2007, p. 48). Fanon’s approach may seem 
extreme in its applicability but points to the interesting point of how a 
paternalistic stance may be a short-term gain (such as with the humanitarian aid) 
but can in the long run be argued to, as Escobar argues, “assume a teleology that 
endlessly reproduces the separation between the reformers and the reformed”. 
Both Spivak and Bhabha are sceptical to Fanon’s direct and confrontational stance 
and instead argue how such an “directly counter-hegemonic discourse is more 
liable to cancellation or even reappropriation by the dominant” (Kapoor, 2002, p. 
652). Instead do they advocate modes of critique and negotiation in order to 
unsettle the hegemony from within.  
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Finally, and connected to the counter-hegemonic modes of resistance that 
Spivak and Bhabha criticizes (although not in Fanon’s sense), would I like to 
highlight another problem that may arise when discussing dominant knowledge 
systems. Baber (2010, p. 752) brings up the example of a rejection of western 
knowledge in favour of establishing an Indian knowledge system that lead to the 
rejection of the western practice of medicine that is vaccine and through this 
several deaths from small-pox. He (Baber, 2010, p. 749) refers to such practices 
as unreflexive nativism that are made only as counter-moves and even though 
Edward Said and his theory on orientalism in many instances have been pointed to 
as responsible is he himself critical of such practices. These practices are the 
consequences of no interrogation but only a rejection. My arguments are supposed 
to be a contribution for a repolitization of a stagnant approach to a field of policy, 
a way to challenge the taken for granted and test the legitimacy. While that of 
course may lead to a rejection there is also a possibility of an affirmation, no 
matter what is the important aspect to bring awareness.  
5.2 Conclusion 
Colin McFarlane does in his attempt to bridge the gap between postcolonial 
theories and the practices of development cite Woost’s statement that “[w]e are 
still riding a top-down vehicle of development whose wheels are greased with a 
vocabulary of bottom-up discourse” (McFarlane, 2006, p. 43). A cynical 
understanding of the quote would be how the development practices are just a 
scam for exploitive purposes, however does Escobar (2011, p. 148), in relation to 
a World bank project in Colombia, argue how this would be a simplistic 
understanding. Instead could the quotation be read as an expression for the duality 
in the developmental policies. An expression of how it is possible to combine a 
notion of solidarity with an explicit self-interest.  
What I have argued for throughout this thesis are two things, first of all have I 
tried to point out how the Swedish policies on foreign aid have been formulated in 
more or less the same way, that there has been continuity. However have this 
point already been made by Odén (2006, p. 15) and Wolgemuth (2012, p. 6) and it 
is merely conditional for my second, major point. I have tried to go one step 
further in not just identifying the, often depoliticised and technical, theories and 
practices but revealing their ideological core. This being that the continuity in the 
policies can be explained as an expression of two myths that are fundamental for 
our understanding of society. These are, the understanding of development as an 
infinite linear teleology and the conception of a market based economy of 
absolute gains. Separately could these theories head in different directions, 
linearity is for example and as mentioned present in Marxism while a total 
commitment to the free market also could lead to rejection of any state-led 
policies or a comparison as it is done through linearity. However, together do 
these two conception create both the ability to measure development and progress 
(through an economised linearity) that support ideas of aid and authority for 
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intervention for development. But also an individualism that justifies the self-
interest and the pursuit of one owns development in accordance with the treaty, 
partnership or market.  
I have used some of Barthes figures of myth to exemplify how these myths are 
expressed. However one of Barthes figures that have yet to be mentioned is the 
tautology, perhaps the most straightforward expression of a myth by its self-
referring logic and therefor inherit certainty (Barthes, 1991, p. 153). I would argue 
that the tautology is most prominently expressed in the position of the contributors 
of aid, in my case Sweden, and through this the creation of the receiver. This is 
due to the whole linear, individual understanding of development being a western 
creation in its own image, and through this understanding is authority established. 
In other words have the western concept of development granted west a position 
as superior by default in relation to those understood as underdeveloped. This 
position is also what gives the reasons for developmental policies and foreign aid 
and what makes them legitimate. So maybe does no this individualism legitimize 
aid out of shame, as proposed in the initial quote (because this would implicate 
guilt) but a rejection of the one percent have and might again cause such a 
reactions. Finally do I hope that it shows how even the most natural or taken for 
granted idea or conception (unconscious or not) has implications for actual 
practices.  
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